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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 









Plaintiff CASE NO. 16630 
and Appellant, 
v. 
ALLENE CLOSE ADAMS, 
Defendant ) 
and Respondent. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~-----·~~~-----·~~~~~~) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Each of the parties to this cause of action served a 
complaint upon each other, with the Court subsequently issu-
ing an order to consolidate the two complaints into one 
cause of action. The issue proposed to be litigated by the 
Respondent was for the Court to make a determination that 
the decedent intended to convey her assets by making a con-
veyance of all of her stock in Utah Power & Light Company to 
the Appellant, and to convey the home, which was owned by 
the decedent, by a Warranty Deed to her daughter, with the 
daughter to have a total vested right of survivorship in tpe 
home upon the demise of the decedent. 
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The Respondent filed a lis pendens at the time of the 
filing of her complaint, and prayed the Court to enter a 
judgment that the subsequent conveyance of the real property 
by the decedent to the Appellant was an invalid conveyance i 
and done by reason of the undue influence of the Appellant 
at a time when the decedent was 89 years of age, and incom-
petent, and further seeking if the Court should uphold the 
conveyance and severing of the joint tenancy of the property 
as between the decedent and the Respondent, that the Court 
take into consideration the assets conveyed to the Appellant 
at the time of the conveyance by the decedent of the real 
and personal property to both the Appellant and Respondent 
and that there be an equal distribution of al 1 of the assets 
of the decedent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon the matter coming to trial and being heard before 
the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, the Court held that the real 
property having been conveyed by a Warranty Deed to the 
Respondent and the decedent in joint tenancy, and the dece-
dent having predeceased the Respondent, that there was a 
vesting of the Estate of the decedent in the surviving joint 
tenant, and that the conveyance of the real property prior 
to the demise of the decedent by the giving of a Quit Claim 
2 
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Deed was a unilateral act that did not determine and ter-
minate the joint tenancy. The Court thereupon granted judg-
ment to the Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
To clarify the parties to this cause of action, the 
Respondent will refer to Edith L. Branscomb, the mother of 
both of the parties to this action as the "Mother", and will 
refer to Respondent as the "Daughter", and will refer to the 
Appellant as the "Son". The mother became demised in 
December, 1978, at the age of 90 years. (R-120) 
On May 1, 1962, the Mother conveyed, by Warranty Deed, 
a joint tenancy to the real property which was the home of 
the Mother, by conveying her home to both herself and to her 
Daughter, while at the same time she conveyed her Utah 
Power & Light stock in joint tenancy by conveying same to 
herself and to her Son. (R-35) 
The shares in Utah Power & Light were conveyd by the 
r.tother to her Son, on March 20, 1962 (R-38), and the number 
of shares which were conveyed by the Mother to the Son, was 
740 shares, which subsequently split two for one, and now 
totals 1,480 shares. (R-37, 38). 
3 
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The Mother transferred the same property which she had 
conveyed by Warranty Deed to her Daughter, by transferring 
same to her Son by a Quit Claim Deed on July 29, 
1977 (R-42), the Mother being 89 years of age at the time of 
such transfer of the property by Quit Claim Deed to the Son, 
(R-46) 
In January, 1977, the Mother was admitted to the hos-
pital, suffering from a massive stroke, which occurred in 
January, 1977, and in the opinion of her attending physi-
cian, Dr. C. Basil Williams, "she was not thereafter compe-
tent to make sound decisions without relying upon her family 
to make the decisions". The hospital records show that the 
Mother was unable to give a medical history at the time of 
her admission, and in the opinion of the attending doctor 
was not competent to make and understand decisions requiring 
competency. (R-46) 
In the Statement of Facts of the Appellant, allegation 
is made on Pages 2 and 3 of Appellant's Brief, that the 
relations between the Mother and Daughter deteriorated, and 
that thereafter the Mother quit claimed the property to the ' 
Son. The citations given in the Brief are TR-41 and TR-46, 
as authority for this statement, and there is nothing in the 
record on either TR-41 and TR-46 or the court stenographer's 
4 
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numbers on the transcript, which for TR-41 would be R-119 
and for TR-46 would be R-124, that in any way substantiate 
or justify such a statement as a Statement of Facts. 
The testimony of a Mrs. Arnold evidences to the con-
trary. Mrs. Arnold was employed for a period of two years, 
prior to the demise of the Mother, to care for her at the 
home of the Mother, and that she cared for her from Monday 
through Friday 5:00 o'clock p.m.; and that from 5:00 o'clock 
p.m. Friday until Sunday morning, the Daughter moved in and 
cared for the Mother, and that the Son cared for the Mother 
on Sunday. (R-117, 118) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPERTY CONVEYED BY WARRANTY DEED IN JOINT 
TENANCY CANNOT BE UNILATERALLY TERMINATED BY JOINT 
TENANT CONVEY ING QUIT CLAIM DEED. 
In~~~~~~~ Q~~.!.~· 592 P.2d 594, (February 23, 1979, 
S.Ct. ot Utah), the court held that where husband and wife 
were joint tenants in real property, that a declaration 
unilaterally made by the wife continued until the wife's 
death, and then vested in the husband as her survivor. 
In the Ne.!_~~~ case, ~~E.!'.~· the husband and wife were 
joint tenants in the property, and the wife, in an attempt 
to avoid the possible consequence of a divorce decre~, con-
5 
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veyed by a quit claim deed her property interest as a joint 
tenant to her daughter, and subsequently the wife became 
demised and the daughter made claim against the property as 
a substituted party in interest, as tenant in common in said 
property. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated that the effect of termi-
nat ing a joint tenancy and converting the tenancy into a 
tenancy in common is not accomplished by a mere unilateral 
declaration of termination of such a tenancy, since such a 
declaration is a nullity, which has no effect upon the joint 
tenancy of the husband, who was the joint tenant, and did 
not vest in the daughter, an interest as a tenant in common, 
when the mother who had conveyed the interest to the daugh-
ter, became demised, in that the surviving spouse had an 1 
estate in the property that vested upon the wife's death, 
and could not be divested by such a unilateral conveyance. 
The Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, made a findings as 
follows: 
I find that the giving of a Quit Claim 
Deed is a unilateral act and does not 
terminate a joint tenancy. Insofar as a 
joint tenancy is concerned, the act is a 
nul 1 i ty which has no effect upon the 
joint tenancy. 
The Court thereupon rendered judgment for the Daughter 
and against the Son, finding that the conveyancy was a 
nullity. (R-60) 
6 
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In ~~!!~~~~~ !~ ~an!!~~~~· 375 Mich.6, 150 N.W.2d 900, 
(S.Ct. of Mich., 1964), the court held that where a joint 
tenant sold the property without consent of the other joint 
tenant who had the right of survivorship, and who did in 
fact survive the first joint tenant, the surviving tenant 
had a right to all proceeds of the sale. 
In ~~~ !.:.. 2hel~~· 296 Mich.215, 287 N.W.439, S.Ct. of 
Mich. (September, 1939), the court held that where property 
stands in the name of joint tenants, with the right of sur-
vivorship, neither party may transfer the title to the prem-
ises and deprive the other of such right of survivorship. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan has held in affirmation of 
this rule in ~ch~!!:!.:..~.!'.£~!· 116 Mich.603, 74 N.W.1012; 
E:in~~ !.:.. !!~}.'.~~~· 144 Mich.352, 107 N.W.910. 
POINT I I 
CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY INTEREST BY INCOMPETENT 
PERSON IS A NULLITY. 
The- Mother, by conveying to her only two children, the 
only major assets which she owned in 1962, evidenced a 
desire to make unneccessary the making of a Will by the 
division of her Estate in conveying of the Utah· Power & 
Light stock to the Son, and the home to the Daughter, both 
7 
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of which conveyances were made with the Mother retaining 
joint tenancy in both the personal property of the stock a~ 
in the real property. (R-35) 
The Mother did die intestate at the age of 90 years, 
becoming demised in 1978, and the conveyance of the stock 
and the home was made in 1962. (R-43) 
The subsequent deteriorating illness of the Mother and 
her conveyance in 1977 at the age of 89 years, by Quit Claim 
Deed of the real property to the Son, fol lowing her stroke 
requires evaluation of her competency and factors of duress 
and influence in depriving her Daughter of her share in the 
Estate. 
The intervening serious illness of the Mother, and the 
statement in the medical records of her attending physician, 
Basil Williams, at the time of her admission to the hospital 
in January, 1977, when she suffered from a massive stroke 
that the Mother was not competent to make a sound decision 
without relying upon her family, makes serious implications 
as to the ability of the decedent to understand the legal 
effect of making the Quit Claim Deed to the Son. (R-46) 
The Court did not al low introduction of evidenc~ by the 
Daughter as to medical testimony, in that the Court, while 
allowing whatever witness were present to testify, stated 
that the testimonies of the witnesses were not material• in 
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that the Court had decided the issue upon the belief of the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, that the conveyance of a Quit 
Claim Deed was a nullity, and did not sever the joint ten-
ancy between the Mother and the Daughter, and that the 
Mother, having become demised, the right of survivorship 
passed the total Estate to the Daughter, as to the real 
property, and the Court stated that the evidence would be 
pursued if the Court felt that the facts already presented 
to the Court as to the status of the tenancy was not suf-
ficient upon which to base an ultimate decision. (R-125) 
The Court did thereafter, render a decision and judg-
ment (R-65) finding that the Quit Claim Deed conveyance was 
a nullity and that the property was vested in the Daughter. 
The Daughter was prepared to present the testimony of 
Dr. Basil Williams and a number of other persons, as to the 
serious disability of the Mother, as the result of the 
stroke in January, 1977, and that the subsequent conveyance 
of the Quit Claim Deed in July, 1977, by the Mother to the 
Son, (R-42) could not be val id in that the Mother was incom-
petent and was in fear of being sent to a rest home, and 
therefore the Son exerted undue influence in prom.ising to 
al low her not to be taken to a rest home and in obtaining 
the Quit Claim Deed from the ~.1other, which together with the 
Utah Power & Light stock which had been conveyed by the 
9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Mother previously, placed in the Son, all of the assets of 
the Mother's Estate, for the sole benefit of the Son, and 
with no comparable part of the Estate going to the Daughter. 
Mrs. Arnold, who lived and attended to the Mother for 
approximately the last two years of her life, stated that 
the Mother, at numerous times, told her that her Daughter 
was going to have the house. (R-120-124) 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the Lower 
Court should be upheld in that the finding of the Court that 
the decisions of a right of survivorship to the surviving 
person of a joint tenancy could not be accomplished by the 
unilateral act of a joint tenant destroying a joint tenancy 
created by a Warranty Deed by the granting of a subsequent 
Quit Claim Deed, and that in any event equity would require 
that the intent of the Mother should be carried out, which 
was evidenced by her division of the stock to the Son and 
the home to the Daughter, and that the further question of 
the competency of the Mother to convey by Quit Claim Deed at 
the age of 89 years, and subsequent to a time when she had 
suffered a massive stroke, and had questionable ability to 
understand the nature of her act, together with the question 
of whether or not there was undue influence on the part of 
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the Son upon his 89 year old Mother, in having her convey to 
him the real property, in addition to the personal property 
is a matter that should be remanded if the Court should hold 
that the tenancy that existed could have been severed by the 
Quit Claim Deed, so that a full hearing on all of the issues 
pertinent to the further equitable and legal principles 
involved in the matter can be adjudicated by the Court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
C~.q ... ~~~vY....__ 
Attorney for Respondent 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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CERTIFICATE OF r.1AILING 
A copy of the foreging Brief of Respondent was posted 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid and addressed to 
the Attorney for the Appellant, Clarence J. Frost, Esquire, 
Attorney at Law, 3536 Market Street, Granger, Utah, 84119, 
on this--~< day of February, 1980 • 
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